Virginia Initial State Response and Containment Plan (ISRCP)

Prevention and Rapid Response for LPAI (H5 and H7)

December 2024

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I. Introduction

A. Overview

Influenza A (IAV) is a viral infection of birds caused by a group of viruses known as type A influenzas. IAV viruses are classified as either highly pathogenic IAV (HPAI) or low pathogenic IAV (LPAI), based on the genetic features of the virus and the severity of disease in poultry. While most IAV viruses are LPAI and usually result in mild or asymptomatic infections, HPAI viruses are associated with very high morbidity and mortality rates in poultry, up to 90 to 100 percent.

This prevention and rapid response plan (officially termed the Initial State Response and Containment Plan [ISRCP]) was developed immediately following the outbreak of INFLUENZA A (H7N2) in the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia during 2002. The Valley outbreak infected 197 poultry flocks and 4.7 million turkeys and chickens. Since 2002, the Emergency Disease Management Committee (EDMC) also known as the Virginia Poultry Disease Task Force (VPDTF), comprised of industry and government representatives, has met at least quarterly to review and update this plan. This plan was designed to prevent and respond to any H5 or H7 avian influenza, regardless of pathogenicity.

Furthermore, numerous mostly harmless strains of mild Influenza A exist throughout the world in wild bird populations, swine, etc, and despite strict biosecurity from time to time a commercial flock will become exposed to non-H5 or H7 subtype INFLUENZA A virus. With Virginia's high level of surveillance for H5 and H7 INFLUENZA A, it is possible that routine testing will detect antibodies for a non-H5 or H7 virus. Response to non-H5 and H7 subtypes will be according to Appendix 14.

In recent years HPAI infected numerous flocks in several states in the US and Virginia must be prepared to respond to an outbreak of H5 or H7 IAV in the Commonwealth or nearby states. A non-negative PCR diagnosis of H5 or H7 virus coupled with classical HPAI clinical symptoms with mortality of 30 percent or greater requires immediate depopulation of the infected flock. Onsite disposal is preferred but other methods can be utilized on a case-by-case basis. Appendix 15 contains guidelines to protect the health and safety of flock depopulation teams responding to an HPAI outbreak.

B. Regional Applicability of this Plan

This plan shall apply to poultry producers and related facilities operating within Virginia unless producers are more closely associated with the poultry operations of an adjoining state. Poultry producers and operations on Virginia's Eastern Shore may be managed in the event of an IAV outbreak according to the Maryland and Delaware Initial State Response and Containment Plan (ISRCP), as those operations are routinely more closely associated with the Delmarva poultry industry. Some poultry producers and operations along the Virginia-North Carolina border may be managed in the event of an IAV outbreak according to the North Carolina ISRCP, as some of those operations are associated with a poultry complex based in North Carolina. This plan may

not apply as written to every circumstance and may need to be updated and/or changed during an incident at the discretion of the State Veterinarian and consultation with the VPDTF members as appropriate.

C. Definitions

"Poultry" means all birds reared or kept in captivity for the production of any commercial animal products or for breeding for this purpose, fighting cocks used for any purpose, and all birds used for restocking supplies of game or for breeding for this purpose, until they are released from captivity. Birds that are kept in a single household, the products of which are used within the same household exclusively, are not considered poultry, provided that they have no direct or indirect contact with poultry or poultry facilities. Birds that are kept in captivity for other reasons, including those that are kept for shows, racing, exhibitions, zoological collections and competitions, and for breeding or selling for these purposes, as well as pet birds, are not considered poultry, provided that they have no direct or indirect contact with poultry or poultry facilities.

"Region" means a geographic area of the Commonwealth comprising a concentration of poultry reasonably segregated from other concentrations of poultry. Virginia contains five poultry regions: the Shenandoah Valley, Central Virginia, Southeastern Virginia, the Eastern Shore, and Southwestern Virginia.

"Suspect Flock" means flock(s) showing clinical signs and/or are serologically positive that requires further diagnosis to include PCR testing.

"Virginia Poultry Federation (VPF)" means the organization that represents all sectors of the poultry industry, from farmers, to processors, to businesses that provide goods and services to the poultry industry. VPF's mission is to promote a positive business climate for the poultry and egg industry in Virginia through effective government and public relations, youth programs, membership services, and educational activities.

II. Prevention

A. Biosecurity

Biosecurity is a critical component of a poultry company's poultry health program. Following strict biosecurity guidelines can reduce the chances that diseases such as Influenza A will come into contact with commercial poultry operations.

Each poultry company will maintain strict biosecurity programs governing all aspects of their operations. VPDTF will maintain industry-wide recommended everyday biosecurity guidelines that adhere to or exceed the National Poultry Improvement Plan (NPIP) program standards (Appendix 1). Poultry companies are encouraged to follow the VPF or equivalent guidelines or more stringent procedures as they deem prudent. Companies will conduct an internal or external audit of their biosecurity procedures on an approximately annual basis. Facilities should also

develop and exercise additional enhanced biosecurity protocols (Appendix 6) for suspect and infected premises. VDACS will provide educational materials to small hobby producers as part of routine surveillance events such as fairs, poultry shows, auctions, swap meets, and other events where poultry is co-mingled. These materials will cover information concerning biosecurity and poultry diseases. Presentations will be given to poultry clubs, 4-H clubs, and small hobby farmers throughout the state to increase their awareness of biosecurity practices.

B. Routine Surveillance

Movement into Virginia[1] - Virginia poultry processors will not import into the state nor should VDACS permit poultry to enter the Commonwealth without a state-certified negative virus detection (Antigen capture Immunoassay [ACIA, eg Flu-Detect][ACIA tests can only be utilized in symptomatic flocks on sick/dead birds], PCR, virus isolation or other approved test) and/or antibody test (AGID or other approved test) for Influenza A subtypes H5 and H7 pursuant to VDACS animal admissions regulations, proclamations, and requirements issued pursuant to Chapter 60, Article 1, Section 3.2 of the Code of Virginia. The requirements are outlined in Appendix 2.

In State Surveillance – All commercial poultry flocks will be tested according to the VDACS Routine Non-epidemic IAV Surveillance Testing (Appendix 3).

In the presence of any of the following signs or symptoms, the company should immediately submit duplicate samples to the HRAHL for IAV diagnostic sampling:

- Significant, unexplained decreases in feed and/or water consumption;
- Significant, unexplained decreases in egg production;
- Significant, unexplained increases in respiratory signs; or
- Significant, unexplained mortality or morbidity.

Second set of samples will be sent to NVSL for confirmation.

C. Emergency Management Disease Committee (EMDC), also known as the Virginia Poultry Disease Task Force (VPDTF)

The VPF has established the VPDTF, which will consist of VDACS, VPF, Virginia Cooperative Extension (VCE), Virginia Maryland College of Veterinary Medicine, USDA APHIS, VDEQ, VDH, local emergency management, WVDA, Virginia Farm Bureau Federation, and at least one representative of each of the poultry companies. The VPDTF will meet at least quarterly to review and update contingency plans related to poultry health emergencies, including but not limited to, prevention, rapid response, and carcass disposal. The VPDTF will conduct exercises at a minimum of at least once every three years. A list of participants is included in Appendix 16.

D. Diagnostic Resources

[1] Excepted from these requirements are poultry imported by poultry companies into Virginia for slaughter, which will fall under the In State Surveillance protocol discussed above and in Appendix 3.

Appendix 5 contains a summary of VDACS diagnostic resources.

III. Rapid Response

a. First Detections

i. Non-negative samples may result from clinical morbidity/mortality or from routine pre-movement surveillance. All non-negative test results on the IAV Matrix will be reported to the State Veterinarian and USDA APHIS Area Veterinarian in Charge (AVIC).All non-negative AGID samples will be confirmed with PCR testing. All non-negative PCR matrix results will be run on H5 and H7 subtypes. Any specimens testing non-negative for IAV must be forwarded to the NVSL for confirmation testing; refer to REF-AV-0011 Network testing algorithm for Avian Influenza. Forward non-negative IAV subtype H5, H7 and non-negative specimens for immediate confirmation: notify the NVSL by phone (515-337-7551) with case information, provide a shipment tracking number, and send submission form (NVSL 10-4) by email to nvsl.dvl.avian@aphis.usda.gov of fax (515-337-7348). Ship to USDA, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, National Veterinary Service Laboratories, 1920 Dayton Ave, Ames, IA 20010. The state veterinarian or his representative will alert the poultry company and request duplicate samples of 20 birds/house per Appendix 4 , if not previously submitted. The poultry farm is quarantined until NSVL results are completed. The state veterinarian or his representative will also notify the VPF.

ii. While awaiting test results, companies should initiate a self-imposed quarantine and initiate enhanced biosecurity guidelines (Appendix 6). Poultry companies will immediately notify VDACS of any non-negative test results not obtained from VDACS labs. In addition, the relevant poultry company will quarantine farms with non-negative test results, and proper biosecurity, pending test results of any samples sent to NVSL. VDACS will quarantine farms with confirmed positive flocks. Flocks epidemiologically linked and/or located within the Control Area are required to utilize EMRS permits for movements of birds and/or products.

iii. When notified by VDACS of a non-negative test result, the VPF will notify the other poultry companies in accordance with Appendix 18. VPF, VDACS, and USDA will consult, and coordinate conference calls/meetings as needed. (Note: If the case involves a WVA flock that is part of a VA poultry complex, the WVDA plan will apply, and the VA task force will consult with WVDA prior to initiating communications activities in VA.)

iv. Per VPDTF agreement, a non-negative PCR diagnosis of H5 or H7 virus subtype and classical INFLUENZA A/HPAI clinical signs with mortality of 30 percent or greater requires immediate depopulation of the infected flock. Onsite disposal is preferred but other methods can be utilized on a case-by-case basis.

b. Confirmed Diagnosis

i. The State Veterinarian will contact the Commissioner of Agriculture, who may consider a Governor's Declaration of Emergency after consultation with VPF. The State Veterinarian may also potentially ask for USDA IMT and USDA National Permitting Unit (to be available when H5/H7 results are reported in several hours).

ii. When the first positive IAV flock is diagnosed by NVSL or sooner if determined necessary by the state veterinarian in commercial or noncommercial poultry, the poultry companies will, region-wide, cease all routine farm visits and immediately notify all growers in the region

within 24 hours. VDACS, with guidance from VPF, will notify its list of vendors, utilities, and government agencies utilizing the VPDTF Biosecurity Notification List within 24 hours via the Virginia Poultry Disease Alert System and request immediate cessation of all non-essential farm visits. The Biosecurity Notification List will be maintained and reviewed by VDACS and VPF. The State Veterinarian, with input from the VPDTF, will consider appropriate restrictions on litter spreading. USDA APHIS VS is the governmental organization authorized to represent the United States to the WOAH.

iii. The Incident Commander (IC) will contact the Planning Section Chief (or Resource Unit Lead if not unavailable) to ask that they contact the IMT Command & General Staff, requesting that the IMT mobilize and meet at the RAHL or other established location. Reference IMT Org Chart,

iv. All USDA personnel resource requests must be sent to APHIS-VS-HPAI-Resources@usda.gov by AVIC or IMT designee. Requests for USDA personnel must include positions requested, report date, rotation type (virtual or on-site), medical clearance (yes or no), name requested, if applicable (home supervisor approved).

v. All movement of poultry and poultry products in a control area during a HPAI outbreak will be traced using the EMRS2 Gateway Permitting System. Each company will be responsible for having staff to input information for permit requests.

vi. Reference Appendix 19for sample timeline of IMT meetings.

c. Case Manager Deployed

i. The IC will contact the Operations Section Chief and Disease Management Branch Director to ask that a case manager prepare to go to the farm as soon as possible (if needed may wait until daylight) to initiate case management procedures to include the following tasks:

1. Appendix 1H https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/emergency_management/downloads/hpai/appendix-1h-indemnity-comp-request.pdf
2. Appendix 2H https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/emergency_management/downloads/hpai/appendix-2h-backyard-flock-management.pdf
3. Collect epidemiologic investigation onto the Initial Contact Epi Report. https://www.aphis.usda.gov/sites/default/files/initialcontact_epi_report.pdf
4. Take additional samples to include EMRS2 Premise ID#.
5. Discuss flock plan with owner and get it started. https://www.aphis.usda.gov/sites/default/files/ai-appendix-flock-plan-template-10232023.pdf Work with VS Field Reimbursement Specialist to develop Compliance Agreement.
6. Quarantine flock/premises, issue notice of quarantine. Appendix 7 contains samples of VDACS Notice of Quarantine.
7. Along with Depopulation and Disposal Group Supervisors (if available), evaluate premises, determine zones, identify clean/dirty line, and propose depopulation plan. USDA reference for HPAI 2014-2015: Ready Reference Guide – Overview of Zones.
    a. Infected Zone – at least 3 KM beyond suspect/infected premise
    b. Buffer Zone – at least 7 KM beyond Infected Zone
    c. Control Zone – Infected Zone and Buffer Zone = minimum of 10 KM

d. Surveillance During an Outbreak

i. Place 10km Control Area (Infected and Buffer Zones) for commercial poultry
    1. All commercial poultry farms in the 10km zone must be tested using PCR
    2. No movement out of the zone will be permitted until commercial poultry testing is complete.
    3. Reference Appendix 4 for Enhanced Testing Protocol and pre-movement testing requirements.
    4. Additional infected premises will constitute a new 10km Control Area.

ii. Backyard Flocks
    1. Place a 10km "State Testing Area" (there is no official USDA Control Area)
    2. Additional infected premises will require a new 10km "State Testing Area"
    3. Inspections and testing to be completed within the 3km Infected Zone of the Control Area.
    4. Reference Appendix 4 for Enhanced Testing Protocol and pre-movement requirements

e. Depopulation and Disposal

i. Methods for depopulation and disposal should follow guidance in 9 CFR 56 (a) and (b). The flock will be depopulated humanely by a pre-identified depopulation team, including a safety officer, who will be on site during the operation. Guidelines for team health and safety are contained inUSDA reference for HPAI Outbreak 2014-2015: Safety, Health & Environmental Protection and Interim Recommendations on PPE for Selected Activities. No activities for which indemnity and/or compensation will be claimed can occur prior to a compliance agreement from APHIS.

ii. Depopulation method will be determined based on production type and resources. Foam depopulation will be the first option for consideration. Companies may utilize their own equipment and team for completion. VDACS can offer either a KIFCO foam unit or "North Carolina" style foam unit if resources are needed. VDACS units are to be operated by trained VDACS personnel. VSD+ will only be considered if resources are not available to depopulate in a timely manner or production type is not conducive to foam depopulation, and approved by USDA if company seeks reimbursement. A list of available resources is maintained by VDACS.

iii. Controlled marketing of INFLUENZA A H5 or H7 positive may be considered as a method of depopulation. It must be approved by the State Veterinarian in consultation with USDA APHIS. Follow guidelines set forth in 9 CFR 56.5 (c). If controlled marketing is authorized, refer to Appendix 8 for management protocol and checklist.

iv. A disposal team, following strict biosecurity protocols, will compost the carcasses in-house if possible. If in-house methods are not feasible due to building or equipment access limitations, the carcasses will be composted on-site, but out of the house. See Appendix 11 for detailed on-site composting procedures. Additional USDA Guidance and Composting Temperature Monitoring Log Sheets can be found at FY2016 HPAI Response Mortality Composting Protocol for Influenza A Infected Flocks.

v. Other methods of disposal that may be considered on a case-by-case basis
    1. Rendering at VDACS-approved rendering facilities. All routine grower visits to these facilities must cease immediately.
    2. Incineration
    3. Disposal at a permitted solid waste landfill in accordance with VDACS Transport of IAV Positive Flocks to Landfill Requirements (Appendix 9) and the DEQ Requirements for Disposal of Infected Bird Carcasses in Sanitary Landfills (Appendix 10. All routine grower visits to these facilities must cease immediately.

4. Burial on the premises if a suitable site is available in accordance with state requirements.
5. Other approved methods

vi. VDACS actively works with the Virginia Department of Transportation, environmental agencies, state police, local law enforcement, municipalities involved in disposal issues to discuss regulations and adequate resources.

f. Indemnity

Indemnity may be requested from USDA in writing for depopulation and disposal of an infected or exposed poultry flock as well as cleaning and disinfection of premises, conveyances, and materials from those flocks. No activities for which indemnity and/or compensation will be claimed can occur prior to a compliance agreement from APHIS. As per 9 CFR 56, a written flock management plan will be developed for all infected flocks. Sample template for these required flock plans is found in Appendix 8. Specific guidance on the procedures and documentation required to receive indemnity are found in the USDA Guidance: Appendix 1H and Appendix 2H. All necessary forms should be collected by the Case Manager as indicated above.

g. Cleaning and Disinfection

Infected Premises must be both cleaned and disinfected focusing on virus elimination in a cost-effective manner. Cleaning and disinfection can be performed with the following cleaning method(s) dry, wet, heat, fumigation, or a combination of two or more. The method(s) selected should consider the characteristics of the premises/houses and other factors which may impact the effectiveness of the virus elimination activities. USDA References for 2016 HPAI Response:
Cleaning & Disinfection Basics (Virus Elimination);
Response Using Heat Treatment for Virus Elimination. Cleaning and disinfection can be completed by the individual grower, company or third-party contractor. Method used needs to be considered on production type and construction style/condition of the house.

h. Vaccination

In the event of an outbreak, the VPDTF will deliberate on the use of vaccine and make recommendations to the State Veterinarian. The State Veterinarian, with guidance and approval from APHIS, will consider approving the use of vaccine according to VDACS IAV Vaccination Protocol (Appendix 12) or another scientifically valid protocol. Companies using IAV vaccines would be required to use Antigen Detection tests or have means to differentiate infected vaccinated birds such as Differentiating Infected from Vaccinated Animals (DIVA) vaccination strategies.

i. Quarantine Release

Cleaning and disinfecting of premises, litter handling, and releasing premises from state quarantine will be done according to VDACS Quarantine Release Requirements (Appendix 13). State and APHIS release of the control area, regaining IAV-free status, and meeting all eligibility requirements for restocking approval of the infected premises will be granted after an inspection has been conducted and passed. Infected premises will require negative environmental samples before quarantine can be released. USDA guidance for HPAI Outbreak FY2022: Control Area Release; Post C&D Environmental Sampling Guidance and Timeline, Eligibility, and Approval for Restocking.

j. Communicating with the Public During an Outbreak

Providing factual information to the public and small poultry producers through news media is an important aspect of responding to an outbreak of Influenza A. VPF will look for guidance to the IAV Communications Response Manual developed by the National Chicken Council and the National Turkey Federation. Media inquiries should be directed to industry, state, and

federal public information officers as necessary. Virginia Poultry Breeders Association and Virginia Cooperative Extension Service may be utilized to communicate IAV events to hobby producers. No press release for HPAI shall occur prior to communicating the news release with USDA APHIS Public Affairs or prior to confirmation of first H5H7 IAV test result from NVSL, Ames, IA. Upon confirmation of IAV, a press release may be issued upon consultation among USDA, VDACS and VPF for public notification. Education and outreach materials are provided to Authorized Testing Agents on biosecurity and prevention of poultry diseases. Resources on poultry disease are available on the VDACS website.

Public Information Officers:

Virginia Poultry Federation	Hobey Bauhan, 540-433-2451
USDA APHIS Legislative and Public Affairs	TBD, 301-734-7799
VDACS	Michael Wallace 804-786-1904

Acronym List

IAV	Influenza A
AVIC-USDA	Area Veterinarian in Charge-United States Department of Agriculture
C&G	Command and General Staff of the Incident Management Team, which includes the Section Chiefs
DOSC	Deputy Operations Section Chief
ED-USDA	Executive Director USDA
IAP	Incident Action Plan
IC	Incident Commander
ICP	Incident Command Post, the field location at which the primary tactical-level, on-scene incident command functions are performed. Mostly likely Rockingham County Offices for Shenandoah Valley and Tri-County Council for Eastern Shore.
ICS	Incident Command System
IMT	Incident Management Team
NVSL	National Veterinary Services Laboratories
OSC	Operations Section Chief
PCR	polymerase chain reaction, type of testing methodology
PSC	Planning Section Chief
RAHL	Regional Animal Health Laboratory
RESL	Resource Unit Leader
SAHO	State Animal Health Official
UC	Unified Command
VDACS	Virginia Department of Agriculture & Consumer Services
VPF	Virginia Poultry Federation

IMT Org Chart



Appendix 1

Virginia Poultry Disease Task Force Biosecurity Guidelines and Audit Checklist

The checklist herein is provided to assist poultry companies in complying with the accompanying Biosecurity Guidelines recommended by the Virginia Poultry Disease Task Force and voluntarily adopted by this company. These biosecurity guidelines are minimum standards, and poultry companies are encouraged to go beyond these basic steps as they determine practical and beneficial for protection of poultry flocks.

(Note to Auditors: Use photography as appropriate to document findings.)

This audit applies to the following company, complex or facility:

Auditor: _____

Company and Complex: _____

Address: _____

_____

Phone: _____ Fax: _____ Date: _____

Accompanied by: _____ (Company Representative)

Title _____

Area	Guideline	Y/N	Recommendation
Service Techs and Breeder Servicing			
Setback for vehicles	Park a minimum of 50' from first poultry house you approach.		
Windows	Keep windows closed on farms.		
Protective Gear	Service techs must put on clean coveralls, hairnets and boots (rubber or disposable) prior to entering poultry houses. Hand sanitation or washing must occur after removal of protective gear.		
Foot Sanitation	Thoroughly clean and disinfect footwear at poultry house entrance. A second pair of boots upon house entrance is effective and recommended.		
Disinfection	Clean and disinfect all equipment before entering and after exiting houses.		
Hand sanitizer	Use hand sanitizer or protective gloves before entering and when exiting houses.		
Upper Respiratory	Blow nose into clean tissue and properly dispose before exiting farm or use N-95 mask.		
Vehicle sanitation	Clean and disinfect vehicles inside daily.		
Feed Mill			
Truck Washing	Wash trucks to remove mud and debris.		
Operational Onboard Disinfectant Sprayers	Onboard disinfectant sprayers with functioning spray nozzles with complete disinfection of all tires must be utilized on all feed trucks.		
Tire Disinfection	Spray tires with an approved disinfectant before entering and exiting farm.		
Clean Cabs	Clean and disinfect the cabs on feed trucks with aerosol product daily. Spray the floors and pedals with approved disinfectant.		

Area	Guideline	Y/N	Recommendation
Hatchery			
Boots Required	All drivers must wear boots (rubber or disposable).		
Tire disinfection	Spray tires with an approved disinfectant before entering and exiting farm.		
Egg truck sanitation	Clean and disinfect egg trucks daily.		
Chick/poult delivery truck sanitation	Maintain cleanliness inside and outside of chick/poult delivery trucks.		
Fly control	Spray insecticide inside trucks as needed to eliminate the transporting of flies from farm to farm.		
Egg rack and tray sanitation	Wash and disinfect egg racks and trays before leaving hatchery.		
Chick/poult box and delivery cart sanitation	Wash chick/poult boxes and delivery carts at least once a week.		
Hatchery Waste Trucks	Clean and disinfect hatchery waste trucks going to rendering before returning to hatchery. (Load should be hauled at the end of the day. If a third-party contractor is used, a written biosecurity program must be in place.)		
Hatchery Waste Trucks	Sweep out the cab and spray pedals and floorboard with approved disinfectant. Spray insecticide as needed. (If a third-party contractor is used, a written biosecurity program must be in place.)		
Source Flock Monitoring	Eggs brought to hatcheries should be from source flocks participating in NPIP.		

Area	Guideline	Y/N	Recommendation
Live Haul			
Equipment sanitation	Clean and disinfect all equipment as needed pursuant to company standard operating procedures.		
Dead Bird Disposal			
Composting	Composting must be managed properly to ensure carcasses are covered to prevent exposure to wild animals and to maintain adequate temperatures for composting.		
Incineration	Carcasses must be protected from exposure to wild animals.		
Communal Disposal	Farms must not share disposal facilities.		
Rendering	Rendering can be used for catastrophic mortality if approved by company management and requires complete C&D at a commercial truck or car wash before trucks return to farm. In no case may vehicles transporting carcasses travel from farm to farm to pick up carcasses. (Note: If a vendor offers a service for transporting frozen carcasses from daily mortality from on farm freezer units to rendering, that service must prove to be a biosecure operation.) .		

Area	Guideline	Y/N	Recommendation
Growers, Farm Managers, and Hired Help			
Perimeter Buffer	Establish an identifiable perimeter buffer zone around the poultry houses that maximizes separation between visitor parking and vehicular traffic and poultry houses. Grass must be kept short and tidy. Keep free of debris and stored equipment and manage to prevent nesting of birds or rodents.		
Line of Separation	Provide a diagram, map and/or a detailed description of the LOS. Provide procedures (e.g., written instructions, signage, training, videos, etc.) to be followed by caretakers, visitors, or suppliers to cross the LOS. The LOS should incorporate Danish Entry concepts. Any equipment crossing a LOS must be cleaned and disinfected. Each poultry house should have a LOS.		
Signage	Post "Biosecurity/Disease Control Area" signs at the perimeter buffer area.		
Visitors	Restrict visitors from entering your poultry barns and do not enter other poultry facilities. No entry allowed in perimeter or poultry houses unless authorized by grower or poultry company.		
Visitor Log and Instructions	Maintain a log of all visitors and provide written instructions on biosecurity procedures. Electronic logs are acceptable.		
Vehicle traffic	Restrict vehicles from entering the perimeter buffer unless they are C&D'd before entering and after exiting.		
Vendor/visitor guidelines	Ensure that vendors with an essential need to enter the perimeter buffer area and/or poultry houses follow all applicable biosecurity requirements.		

Restrict animals	Do not allow pets, livestock or wild animals to enter poultry houses. Consider keeping livestock out of at least a 10-foot buffer zone around poultry houses.		
Wild birds	Keep wild birds out of poultry houses. Eliminate standing water wherever possible. Implement BMPS to mitigate presence of wild birds in any unavoidable standing water.		
Water and feed consumption	Record of daily water and feed consumption are available for each flock since placement in the poultry house.		

Area	Guideline	Y/N	Recommendation
Growers, Farm Managers, and Hired Help (cont.)			
Water supplies	Water must come from deep wells or sources that have been treated to eliminate any potential contamination with live virus.		
Manure and litter management	Manure and spent litter must be handled in a manner that limits the spread of infectious disease. At a minimum, litter leaving the premise must be covered during transport on state roads; tires must be cleaned and disinfected before departure; trucks must never go from one poultry farm to another in the same day; and any equipment used in cleanouts must be thoroughly cleaned and disinfected between jobs.		
Spilled feed	Feed bins must be secured to prevent contamination by wild birds or rodents. Any spilled feed must be cleaned up and disposed of immediately.		
Rodent and insect control	Practice rodent and insect control consistent with poultry company formal written vector control program. Document implementation.		

Workroom sanitation	Keep workrooms clean and personal sanitizing equipment clean and serviceable with fresh disinfectant.		
Other birds	No birds of any kind will be visited or kept by the grower or hired help.		
Sanitation of equipment	Equipment must be effectively sanitized between uses. Sharing of equipment is discouraged, but when necessary equipment must be cleaned and sanitized between each farm.		
Clothing and footwear	Footwear disinfection stations, site-provided footwear, or site-provided foot covers are available outside all external entrances, and everyone is required to clean and disinfect their footwear or wear site-provided footwear or footwear covers prior to entering poultry houses, processing areas, and office areas. If footbaths are used, they must be changed at least daily or more often if the footbath collects dirt, egg contents or manure.		
Clothing	Growers must wear clean protective clothing or clothing dedicated to the farm prior to entering the poultry houses.		
Entrances	External entrances are kept locked to poultry houses and egg processing areas whenever farm personnel are not present.		
Reporting	Producers will immediately report any increased mortality or morbidity to their flock supervisor and/or company veterinarian.		

Area	*Guideline*	*Y/N*	*Recommendation*
General			
Biosecurity Officer	Poultry complexes and independent poultry farms will have a Biosecurity Officer capable of designing and implementing effective biosecurity procedures. The Biosecurity Officer must be an experienced poultry veterinarian or should consult with one. He or she is responsible for developing site-specific biosecurity plans and training all personnel. The Biosecurity Officer should have the authority to ensure compliance with biosecurity protocols and take corrective action as needed. He or she continuously adopts the plan and procedures to address changing risks.		
Training of employees and other personnel	The Biosecurity Officer ensures that farm employees, contract crews, truck drivers and service personnel are trained on site-specific biosecurity SOPs. Training materials should be provided in languages understood by employees. The site-specific biosecurity plans should be distributed to every employee, and training should be reviewed and documented to make sure every employee understands the concepts and procedures that apply to their area of responsibility.		

Avoid other birds	Poultry company personnel and growers must avoid any contact with live bird markets and noncommercial poultry. Follow company procedures, including adequate sanitation and specified waiting periods prior to re-entering poultry facilities, after hunting, hiking, golfing, or other activities with potential exposure to wild fowl. Companies will perform a documented assessment of service tech contact with other poultry or bird species at hire and annually.		
Area	Guideline	Y/N	Recommendation
General (cont.)			
Vector Control Program	Poultry companies must have a formal, written vector control program for contract growers and company owned farms to follow.		
Surveillance	Poultry companies will comply with applicable disease surveillance protocols.		
Biosecurity training	Poultry companies will hold annual training on Biosecurity Program for service techs, hatchery personnel, feed mill personnel, live-haul personnel, and growers. Poultry companies will maintain documentation of training for auditor review.		
Biosecurity audits	Poultry company will conduct audits semiannually using criteria herein. One of the audits must be conducted by an approved outside auditor.		
Enhanced biosecurity	If there is an outbreak of a highly contagious disease refer to the prevention and rapid response plan and individual company policies for increased biosecurity measures.		

APPENDIX 2
Avian Entry Requirements, as provided in regulation 2VAC5-141-60.

2VAC5-141-60. Poultry entry requirements; exemptions.

A. Within the 30 days prior to its date of entry into Virginia, poultry must be deemed healthy and free of infectious diseases and all required tests must be completed. Proof of examination and test results must be submitted with the permit request and on a Certificate of Veterinary Inspection; VS 9-3, if the shipper is a NPIP participant; or in a format approved by the State Veterinarian. All poultry shall be accompanied by an electronic or written Certificate of Veterinary Inspection, VS 9-3, or alternative movement document approved by the State Veterinarian, which shall be in the possession of the person in charge of such poultry.

B. Chickens, turkeys, and hatching eggs of chickens and turkeys shall not be imported into Virginia unless originating exclusively from flocks or hatcheries participating in the NPIP or issued a permit and found to be negative on a Pullorum-typhoid test within 30 days prior to entry.

C. Poultry shall not be imported into Virginia unless the following conditions are met concerning Influenza A (H5 and H7):

1. Requirements governing hatching eggs and certain day-old birds:

a. Hatching eggs shall originate from a breeder flock that participates in and meets the requirements of the "U.S. Avian Influenza Clean" program for chickens or the "U.S. H5/H7 Avian Influenza Clean" program for turkeys of the NPIP.

b. Day-old chickens, day-old game birds, and day-old turkeys shall originate from a hatchery that only handles hatching eggs that originate from breeding flocks that participate in and meet the requirements of the "U.S. Avian Influenza Clean" or the "U.S. H5/H7 Avian Influenza Clean" programs of the NPIP.

c. A statement certifying that the breeder flock shipping hatching eggs and all breeder flocks supplying eggs to the hatchery shipping day-old chickens, day-old game birds, or day-old turkeys participates in and meets the requirements of the "U.S. Avian Influenza Clean" or the "U.S. H5/H7 Avian Influenza Clean" programs of the NPIP shall be provided.

2. Requirements governing all other poultry:

a. The poultry shall be tested and found negative for Influenza A (H5 and H7) within 14 days prior to entry into Virginia or shall come from a flock that has first been tested with negative results within 14 days prior to entry into Virginia as follows:

(1) Breeding chickens and turkeys: 20 birds per house minimum, or for flocks of 500 or fewer, 20 birds minimum as long as all houses and pens on the premises are represented.

(2) Grow-out turkeys for immediate slaughter at a slaughter establishment: 10 birds per house minimum for multi-stage farms and 10 birds per farm, with at least five birds per house, on single-stage farms.

(3) Broiler chickens less than or equal to 70 days of age for immediate slaughter at a slaughter establishment: 11 birds per premises with at least one per house.

b. The results of the tests for Influenza A are recorded and signed by an accredited veterinarian in the state of origin or are recorded on a report issued by a laboratory approved by any state or federal animal authority. Only agar gel immunodiffusion (AGID), enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA), polymerase chain reaction (PCR), virus isolation, or other Influenza A test methods approved by the State Veterinarian and conducted in a laboratory approved by a state or federal animal health authority will be permitted.

D. This chapter shall not apply to birds that are passing directly through Virginia to another state in interstate commerce.

E. This section shall not be construed to (i) permit the entry into Virginia of any species otherwise prohibited or restricted by any state or federal law, regulation, or directive; or (ii) contravene additional entry requirements imposed by any state or federal law, regulation, or directive.

Statutory Authority

§§ 3.2-5902 and 3.2-6002 of the Code of Virginia.

Historical Notes

Derived from Virginia Register Volume 28, Issue 8, eff. January 18, 2012; amended, Virginia Register Volume 32, Issue 3, eff. November 19, 2015; Volume 35, Issue 9, eff. February 7, 2019.

Appendix 3

VDACS Routine NPIP Testing Surveillance

Turkeys

- Breeders
  - Pre-movement/Pre-slaughter Testing
    - 20 birds per house
    - Testing options
      - AGID
      - ELISA
      - PCR
- Grow Out
  - Pre-movement/Pre-slaughter Testing
    - For single age farms (all in, all out)
      - 10 birds per farm, with at least 5 birds per house
    - For multi age farms
      - 10 birds per house
    - Testing options
      - AGID
      - ELISA
      - PCR

Chickens

- Breeders
  - Pre-movement/Pre-slaughter Testing
    - 20 birds per house
    - Testing options
      - AGID
      - ELISA
      - PCR
- Grow Out
  - Pre-movement/Pre-slaughter
    - 11 birds per farm, with at least 1 bird per house
    - Testing options
      - AGID
      - ELISA
      - PCR

Sample/Timing

Sampling prior to movement of birds must be done no more than **14 days prior to movement** (to slaughter or to another farm). For PCR, 11 oropharyngeal swabs per 5.5 ml BHI tube or 5 oropharyngeal swabs per 3.0 ml BHI tube. Any ELISA-serology non-negative sample must be confirmed by AGID. Non-negative AGID and antigen detection test results must be confirmed in a Federal Reference Laboratory, which will also determine the subgroup, and which will be the sole and final authority for declaring a flock non-negative for H5 or H7 IAV. Samples will be collected according to NVSL recommended guidelines.

Passive Surveillance

Birds, older than 21 days of age, submitted to a VA diagnostic lab for any reason will be screened for IAV using an approved antigen detection test. Flocks (older than 21 days of age) showing “elevated mortality” will be tested using an approved antigen detection test.

Refer to USDA Work Instruction 20 for proper collection guidelines.

Appendix 4
VDACS Enhanced/Control Zone IAV Surveillance Testing

Commercial Testing Protocol can be found at
https://www.aphis.usda.gov/sites/default/files/survsampling_controlarea_commercial.pdf

Backyard

- Backyard flocks located in the 3km Infected Zone will be interviewed and left contact information.
- Testing will be completed on sick/dead birds, minimum of 5 gallinaceous birds (no waterfowl)
    - Pre-movement
        - Up to 30 birds per farm
        - Within 48 hours of movement
    - Pre-slaughter Testing
        - Up to 30 birds per farm
        - Within 72 hours of movement

All Control Zone testing will be completed using PCR.

All commercial farms located in the Control Zone must be tested within 72 hours.

Commercial farms should be re-tested 14 days after initial test.

If a new Control Zone is created, all farms that are located in the overlap area will restart their testing schedule in coordination in the new Control Zone.

Pre-movement time period defined as beginning at sample collection date and ends at the state of the load out date. Must load out farm continuously.

Flocks with clinical symptoms should submit Oropharyngeal Swabs (20 birds per house in duplicate)

Samples will be collected according to NVSL recommended guidelines.

APPENDIX 5
Diagnostic Resources

The overall mission of the Virginia Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (VDACS) Animal Health Laboratory System (AHLS) is to provide quality diagnostic and regulatory testing of specimens from animals, raw foods and limited environmental origin to the citizens of the Commonwealth of Virginia in a timely manner and at reasonable cost. As such, the 4 regional animal health laboratories (RAHLs), and in particular the Harrisonburg RAHL, provide diagnostic support for the detection of Influenza A throughout the Commonwealth. All 4 RAHLs are authorized by the National Poultry Improvement Plan (NPIP) and follow NPIP protocols and procedures. The Harrisonburg RAHL is a member laboratory of the National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN), providing contract real time reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (RRT-PCR) testing for Influenza A (IAV) and Exotic Newcastle Disease (END), in support of regional and national IAV and END surveillance testing programs. Other IAV testing services include agar gel immunodiffusion (AGID), and antigen capture immunoassay (ACIA) testing.

There is a written MOU in place that the lab will immediately report all non-negative results to the State Veterinarian and samples sent to NVSL for confirmation.

The VDACS NPIP and/or NAHLN approved laboratory providing IAV testing:

Harrisonburg RAHL (Necropsy/pathology, ELISA, AGID
621 Mt. Clinton Pike RT-PCR, ACIA)
Harrisonburg, VA 22802
Dr. Jessica Walters
(540) 209-9130

Lynchburg RAHL (Necropsy/pathology, ELISA, AGID)
4832 Tyreeanna Rd.
Lynchburg, VA 24504

Additional VDACS approved laboratories providing diagnostic services:

Warrenton RAHL (Necropsy/pathology)
272 Academy Hill Road
Warrenton, VA 20186
Dr. Jamie Weissman
(540) 347-6385

Wytheville RAHL (Necropsy/pathology)
250 Cassell Road
Wytheville, VA 24382
Dr. Chris Halsey
(276) 228-5501

Although all the VDACS RAHLs above provide necropsy services to poultry producers in the Commonwealth, other routine and surge diagnostic testing for Influenza A occurs at the Harrisonburg RAHL. Analysts at the Harrisonburg RAHL are required to complete yearly Influenza A proficiency testing surveys coordinated by the National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) for both serology (AGID) and PCR testing. All Influenza A testing is conducted with strict adherence to NVSL and NAHLN protocols.

Any reactive samples are immediately forwarded to the NVSL for confirmatory testing. Those samples are sent via Federal Express overnight delivery. The NAHLN lab will communicate with NVSL via electronic messaging.

By virtue of the flexibility inherent in the regional animal health laboratory system, additional personnel and diagnostic testing capabilities are available to the Harrisonburg RAHL in the event of a need for surge capacity testing. For example, RT-PCR testing capability can be increased 4-fold overnight by the supplementation of additional thermocycler equipment normally used in the other RAHLs for other programs. Overall surge capacity is primarily dependent on the availability of testing reagents.

Routine and Surge Capacity for IAV testing at the Harrisonburg RAHL

Test	Routine	Surge Capacity
AGID	104,000/year	200,000
ACIA	Variable, depending on test kit availability	
RRT-PCR	2000/year	52,000

Routine and Surge Capacity for IAV testing at the Lynchburg RAHL

Test	Routine	Surge Capacity
AGID	104,000/year	200,000

APPENDIX 6
VPF Company Quarantine and Enhanced Biosecurity Requirements

1. Poultry companies will place quarantines on any non-negative flocks. All poultry will remain on quarantined farm unless moved under a state issued EMRS Permit. Commercial poultry flocks that are epidemiologically linked to the index premise and farms in the control area are not quarantined but required to have an EMRS permit prior to bird/product movement.
2. Eliminate all service and other visits to that farm except dedicated service technician or veterinarian
3. Service technician or veterinarian cannot visit another farm for 48 hours after leaving quarantined premise
4. Specifically restrict movement of grower and family individuals and employees to essential visits only
5. Notify vendors of quarantined premise and cease nonessential visits
6. Establish Cleaning & Disinfection station at entrance to farm and C & D all vehicles entering and leaving premises
7. Feed deliveries
    7.1. Make delivery last stop
    7.2. Driver must not enter poultry house
    7.3. Driver must wear plastic boots unless climbing feed tanks
    7.4. Driver must use hand sanitizer before leaving farm
    7.5. Driver must bathe and launder clothing after leaving farm
    7.6. Truck must be thoroughly cleaned and disinfected after leaving farm
8. All dead birds should be disposed of on farm by either incineration or composting.
9. Eggs are exempted from quarantine on farm pending their disinfection and proper biosecurity.
10. Companies will require that contractors operating Poultry House Cleanout Machines to clean and disinfect between farms. To include power washing all debris from equipment, disinfect equipment and tires.

APPENDIX 7
VDACS Quarantine Notice and Premises Virus Elimination Inspection Report

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER SERVICES
DIVISION OF ANIMAL AND FOOD INDUSTRY SERVICES

Notice of QUARANTINE

By virtue of the authority vested in the STATE VETERINARIAN OF VIRGINIA by §§ 3.2-6001, 3.2-6002, 3.2-6003, and 3.2-6005 of the *Code of Virginia (1950)*, the following quarantine is hereby established this _____day of _____, 20__, and is to remain in effect until withdrawn in writing by the State Veterinarian or his authorized representative.

Location of Premise or Area and Description of Animals

_____

Basis for Quarantine _____

Census of Animals on Premise _____

No _____ may enter or leave the premises or area herein quarantined during the effective period of this quarantine except by written permission of the State Veterinarian or his representative.

Other Specific Requirements of this Quarantine Order (§§ 3.2-6004, 6006, 6007, 6008 of the *Code of Virginia (1950)*)

_____

Any person who violates this quarantine or assists another to violate this quarantine may be convicted of a Class I misdemeanor, which carries a penalty of up to twelve months in jail or a fine of up to $2,500, or both (§ 3.2-6018 of the *Code of Virginia (1950)*).

Given under my hand this_____ By Order of the State Veterinarian

day of_____, 20 _Signed: _____

Copy and attachment acknowledged by: Title_____

Original

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER SERVICES
DIVISION OF ANIMAL AND FOOD INDUSTRY SERVICES

This quarantine has fully accomplished its purpose and is hereby withdrawn.

By Order of the State Veterinarian

Given under my hand this_____Signed: _____

day of_____,20____ Title: _____

VDACS-03021 AFIS (05/10)

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

Premises Virus Elimination Inspection Report

Quarantine # _____ Date: _____

Premise ID# _____

Owner's Name_____

Farm Name (if different) _____

Address_____

City_____ Zip _____

County _____

Number of houses on premises _____Number of houses inspected _____

_____ **PASSED**

_____ **FAILED** (See Remarks for reason or needed corrections)

Remarks:

- Keep litter in house for 2 weeks with curtains drawn and doors closed, no admittance.
- Only spread litter "on the farm" or at a VDACS approved site.
- If litter leaves the farm, it must be covered and travel by a route approved by VDACS.
- Litter should be spread no closer than 100 yards from the nearest poultry house.
- Removal of gross contamination, organic material, and debris from the premises or respective structures, via mechanical means like sweeping (dry cleaning) and/or the use of water and soap or detergent (wet cleaning). The goal is to minimize the remaining organic material so disinfection can be effective.
- Disinfection of surfaces to destroy or eliminate HPAI through physical (e.g., heat) or chemical (e.g., disinfectant) means. A combination of methods may be required with the primary purpose to destroy or eliminate all Influenza A viruses on the premises as cost effectively as possible.
- Houses must be cleaned and disinfected then inspected by VDACS prior to adding new shavings.
- All feeders and other equipment must be thoroughly washed to remove all organic residues before disinfection.
- Houses must remain open a minimum of 3 weeks between flocks.
- HPAI Post C&D Environmental Samples have been collected on premises and sent to NVSL.
- **Final approval of the satisfactory completion of virus elimination is at the discretion of the VDACS or USDA inspector.**

Disclaimer: The above listed poultry house(s) were inspected on this day. The approval of virus elimination procedures in no way guarantees that the virus no longer exists in these houses or precludes the likelihood of a replacement flock becoming infected or any future outbreaks of Influenza A on this premises. Please do not repopulate until you receive environmental sample tests results and receive approval from VDACS or the company.

_____ _____

Inspectors Signature (Disposal Group) Owner (or representative) Signature

_____

Authorized Verification Officer Signature (Case Manager)

APPENDIX 8
"Controlled marketing" Protocol and Checklist

Controlled Marketing – At the discretion of the State Veterinarian and in consultation with USDA APHIS, poultry that are infected with H5/H7 INFLUENZA A may be allowed to move for controlled marketing in accordance with 9 CFR 56.5 (c) and the following requirements.

1. Poultry infected with H5/H7 INFLUENZA A will not be transported to processing until approved by the State Veterinarian.
3. Strict biosecurity measures must be maintained to ensure that the virus does not spread during the extended time that the flock needs to clear the virus and meet conditions for movement to processing. To be considered virus negative would require that the flock has been tested by RT-PCR or VI a minimum of 2 times at least 7 days apart. The last test should be conducted within 72 hours of processing. Sample size is 33 swabs per house.

4. Flocks moved for controlled marketing must be the last poultry marketed during the week they are marketed.
5. All personnel involved in the load out must observe strict biosecurity procedures including disinfection of all clothing, footwear, vehicles, and equipment that leave the farm.
6. All vehicles and containers transporting the flock to processing must be thoroughly cleaned and disinfected at the facility after unloading.
7. Following controlled marketing of a flock cleaning and disinfection of the premises, litter handling, and quarantine release will be performed according to Appendix 13.

Approval for the controlled marketing of a flock infected with or exposed to H5/H7 INFLUENZA A is at the discretion of VDACS and APHIS. Controlled marketing would be considered under the following criteria:

Serology positive/virus negative

- Flock is serologically non-negative but has tested negative for virus.
- To be considered virus negative would require that the flock has been tested by RT-PCR or VI a minimum of 2 times at least 7 days apart. The last test should be conducted within 72 hours of processing. Sample size is 33 swabs per house.
- There are no clinical signs present in the flock.
- Strict biosecurity as outlined in the flock plan can be maintained until the flock is processed.
- Processing plant is available to receive the birds.
- Processing can occur when there is sufficient time to allow for a thorough cleaning and disinfection of the processing plant as well as all equipment used in the loading and transportation of the flock (e.g.) at the end of the week or the end of a shift.

Virus non-negative

- Flock is of an age where it could be held for the time period required to test negative for the virus.
- The flock has been tested by RT-PCR or VI a minimum of 2 times at least 7 days apart. The last test should be conducted within 72 hours of processing. Sample size is 33 swabs per house.
- Strict biosecurity as outlined in the flock plan can be maintained until the flock is processed.

- Proximity to other commercial farms is considered in the decision to allow controlled marketing.
- Processing plant is available to receive the birds.
- Processing can occur when there is sufficient time to allow for a thorough cleaning and disinfection of the processing plant as well as all equipment used in the loading and transportation of the flock (e.g.) at the end of the week or the end of a shift.

Other items for consideration:

- Proximity to other commercial flocks.
- Flocks approved for controlled marketing must not be moved to the processing plant without notification to Virginia Poultry Federation (VPF) within four days of movement.
- Once notified, VPF will notify poultry industry companies, VDACS, and APHIS of the time and route to the processing plant.

APPENDIX 9
Requirements for Transport of Infected Materials to Landfills document

VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER SERVICES
DIVISON OF ANIMAL AND FOOD INDUSTRY SERVICES
OFFICE OF THE STATE VETERINARIAN

_____
(Date)

Requirements for Transport of Infected Materials to Landfills

The following procedures must be followed to be in compliance with requirements for the transport of infected materials (birds, litter and etc.) to off-site locations. If litter is not sent to the landfill, it must be composted in the house according to the previously published protocol. This process must be conducted under the supervision of a representative of the State Veterinarian. Upon completion of the load-out, this document must be signed and retained by VDACS. Only sanitary landfills approved by the State Veterinarian may be used for disposal.

- □ If possible, the driver of the vehicle should remain in the vehicle with the windows closed. If the driver exits the vehicle they must meet the biosecurity standards for clothing, shoes, etc. as outlined below.

- □ Birds must be euthanized prior to transport and sprayed with disinfectant.

- □ A disposable plastic sheet must be placed at the door of the barn that will be the pathway for loading out birds/litter. At the end of the load out this sheet should be folded up and deposited in the last landfill container.

- □ The truck/container used for transport must be first lined with tough (minimum 6-mil thickness) disposable polyethylene plastic sheeting large enough to cover the carcasses and be sealed at the top. If leak-proof trucks with good seals are used, only one layer of plastic is required. If, in the judgment of the VDACS or USDA inspector on site, there is any reason to doubt the quality of the seals or ability to prevent leaks, two layers of plastic will be required. The sheets may be secured to the sides of the container with double-sided tape to facilitate loading.

- □ Bio-Bags may be available from the USDA National Veterinary Stockpile and are an alternative method to transport HPAI carcasses to landfills.

- □ The first layer inside the plastic sheet(s) should be at least one (1) foot of absorbent material (sawdust, straw, hay or litter) to absorb fluids.

- □ Materials should be loaded into the container carefully to avoid tearing the plastic liner. The handling of carcasses should be kept to a minimum.

- □ At least one (1) foot of headspace should be left at the top of the container to allow for expansion of materials during transport.

- □ When the container is properly filled, the plastic liner should be closed over the top and sealed (taped), then sprayed with disinfectant.

- □ The top of the truck/container must be covered in such a way as to prevent material from blowing out at highway speeds. The material used to cover the top must be capable of being cleaned / disinfected.

- □ All personnel involved in the load-out observe strict biosecurity including disinfection of all clothing, footwear, vehicles and equipment that leave the farm.

- □ Vehicles and equipment must be first cleaned to remove organic material then thoroughly sprayed with disinfectant, including tires, wheel wells and undercarriages of vehicles.

- □ Trucks transporting this material are required to travel via a route approved by the State Veterinarian and must drive from the farm to the landfill without making stops in between.

- □ Upon reaching the landfill to off-load, drivers should remain in the vehicle with the windows closed.

- □ All vehicles and containers that transport infected materials to landfills must be thoroughly cleaned and disinfected at the landfill after dumping the materials.

- □ Any problems or breaks in these biosecurity procedures are to be reported immediately to the Office of the State Veterinarian or his representative (804-692-0601). Any deviations from this protocol require the approval of the State Veterinarian or his representative.

Farm or Owner Name: _____ Company _____

Premise ID (EMRS2) Number _____

_____ _____ _____ _____
VDACS Date Owner/Poultry Co. Rep Date

Name of Trucking Company _____ Truck Lic. Plate # _____

Trailer Plate # _____

Landfill Destination: _____

Time(s) of departure of Truck(s):

Comments:

APPENDIX 10
DEQ Requirements for Disposal of Infected Bird Carcasses in Sanitary Landfills

VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY

Requirements for Burial of Infected Bird Carcasses in Sanitary Landfills

The following procedures will be followed to ensure safe receipt and disposal of Avian Flu infected materials (birds, litter, and etc.).

- Submit **"Special Waste Disposal Request for Emergency Poultry Mortality"** form, found on the Virginia DEQ Webiste.
- All poultry carcass transport trucks arriving at the landfill will be directed away from the active working face to a specified area for poultry carcass disposal.
- A single trench, or multiple trenches, will be excavated into existing waste for carcass disposal. Excavated solid waste will be staged adjacent to trench for application to deposited carcasses.
- Trucks will back up to the excavated trench and deposit their load. Any carcasses that do not fall directly into the trench will be immediately placed into the excavation.
- Drivers and passengers must remain in truck while within the disposal area and until disinfection of the truck is completed.
- Deposited carcasses will be covered immediately with at least two feet of the excavated solid waste.
- Multiple trucks may off-load into the same excavated trench provided off-loading is performed immediately upon arrival at the landfill. Carcasses must be covered progressively when multiple trucks are off-loading in the same excavation.
- Once emptied, trucks will pull forward for disinfection. All vehicles will be pressure washed with a disinfectant approved by VDACS. The entire vehicle (excluding the interior of the vehicle cab) will be disinfected, including tires, wheel wells, undercarriages, and both the internal and external surfaces of truck/trailer beds, sidewalls, tailgates, and tarps.
- All disinfection spray and overspray will be directed to flow back into the excavated trench. No runoff from the disinfection will occur.
- Any equipment or personal protective equipment used to manage the carcasses or other contaminated material must be disinfected or disposed of at the end of the day or as appropriate. No material used to manage carcasses shall leave the disposal area without disinfection.
- The landfill must maintain an active bird management program at all times to eliminate the potential for wild bird exposure to poultry carcasses.

VDACS will consult with environmental agencies, transportation agencies and other businesses involved in disposal issues.

APPENDIX 11

United States Department of Agriculture

FY2016 HPAI Response

Job Aid: Overview of the HPAI Composting Process

May 12, 2016

Note: The purpose of this document is to provide a summary of the USDA APHIS *Mortality Composting Protocol for Influenza A Infected Flock s* and is not a substitute for that document. All appendices referenced below can be found in that Protocol located at www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep.

CONDUCTING THE FARM ASSESSMENT

In order to plan for windrow construction at the affected premises, a Farm Assessment is required. The Farm

Assessment may be provided by the Site Manager or may be developed by a composting Subject Matter Expert (SME) recognized by APHIS. The following components found within the assessment must be completed.

- Evaluate the barn configuration to determine if space is adequate for windrow(s) construction within the poultry barns. If not, assess other on-site structures or outside compost sites (*see Appendix A)*.
- Evaluate the type and quantity of infected materials to be composted, including
  - carcass: type, size, number, and condition;
  - in-barn manure/litter: volume, moisture content, and density;
  - stored manure/litter: volume, moisture content, and density;
  - routine mortality method, location, and physical condition of mortalities;
  - feed: quantity and location;
  - eggs: quantity and condition; – clean bedding; and – paper products.
- Calculate the amount of carbon needed for composting (*see Appendix B).*
- Evaluate premises for supplemental water and include the source and application method.
- Evaluate on farm equipment availability and determine any supplemental equipment needs.
- Ensure all overhead lines and poultry house equipment are removed or out of the way. Be sure all loose cords cables or hoses are secured so that they will not become entangled by equipment.
- Ensure ventilation is balanced to reduce the risk of disease transmission while maintaining air quality for worker safety.

ARRANGING FOR NECESSARY EQUIPMENT

Following a Farm Assessment, the SME coordinates with the Site Manager and requests additional resources from the Incident Management Team (IMT) Logistics Branch. The resource list includes, but is not limited to:

- skilled equipment operators and general laborers;
- skid loader(s), pay loaders, dump trucks, rakes, and scoops;
- sawdust, litter, wood shavings, active compost, woodchips, or other carbon material; and
- compost thermometers (36” or 48” stem length).

CONSTRUCTING COMPOST WINDROWS

When constructing compost windrows, the SME should ensure that the following key elements are incorporated into the construction of the compost windrows:

- windows formed outside of poultry houses are sited in consultation with State and local officials to minimize environmental impacts;
- windrows (finished dimensions not to exceed 6 to 8 feet high and 12 to 15 feet wide) are constructed on adequate and uniform base layer (10 to 15 inches thick) of sufficiently porous carbon material;
- base layer and windrow are not compacted with equipment;
- feed from the feed bins and pans is distributed evenly into the compost mix;
- good carcass to carbon contact is achieved by creating a core with a minimum of 1:1 mix volume of carcasses and other infected materials (manure, eggshells, feed, etc.) and carbon;
- windrows are constructed to ensure adequate distribution of moisture throughout; and
- windrows are capped with carbon material (minimum 8 to 12 inches thick) to ensure that no carcasses are exposed.

TEMPERATURE MONITORING

Once windrow construction has been approved by the SME, daily temperature monitoring for 14 days can begin following the standard operating procedure (SOP) for temperature monitoring (*see Appendix D*). Temperature data should be recorded on the temperature log (*see Appendix E)*, or in a comparable electronic document. The health and safety of the individual conducting the temperature monitoring should be protected by following the ammonia safety procedures outlined in *Appendix F*, and any other safety procedures required by the Incident Command (IC) or employer.

TURNING THE WINDROWS

After the evaluation and approval of the temperature data collected during the initial 14-day compost cycle, the windrow is eligible for turning. The SME or appointed designee will signal approval using the *Phase 1 Windrow Approval Checklist* (*see Appendix G*). Unless obvious problems are noted (leachate, exposed birds, poorly mixed piles, or excessive vector activity), windrows should not be disturbed before the end of the 14-day period. Physical mixing or rebuilding of the windrows will require restarting the 14-day period. Adding or replacing the cap materials or placement of clean carbon sources around the windrow base will not require restarting of the 14-day period. Turning must provide homogenization of the core, base and cap materials, and windrows must maintain adequate porosity and structure after turning. Following a second successful 14-day compost period, the SME or appointed designee will signal approval for releasing the windrow from quarantine by using the *Phase 2 Windrow Approval Checklist* included in *Appendix G*. If soft tissue is observed on the windrow surface, a 2 to 4 inch carbonaceous cap needs to be applied. See *Appendix H* for turning equipment and methods.

TROUBLESHOOTING PROBLEMS

In the event that windrows fail to perform in the required manner, the following table offers some of the most common composting problems and possible solutions that may be implemented. The advice and council of an SME should be sought in identifying and prescribing remedies for underperforming compost processes.

Problem	Issue	Solution
Excessive flies or odor	Exposed carcasses	Add additional cap material
Leachate from windrow	Mixture too wet	Add additional carbon material, mix and cap
Temperature does not reach 131ºF	Mixture too dry (< 40%) moisture)	Add water to pile, mix if necessary
Temperature does not reach 131ºF	Mixture too wet (> 60%) moisture)	Add additional carbon material, mix if necessary
Temperature drops early	Not enough oxygen	Aerate or mix pile

Mortality Composting Protocol for Influenza A Infected Flocks may be found at:
https://www.aphis.usda.gov/sites/default/files/mortalitycompostingprotocol.pdf

APPENDIX 12
IAV Vaccination Protocol

Several different types of Influenza A vaccines may be available for use during an IAV outbreak. Inactivated IAV vaccines may be used, but these vaccines typically cause vaccinated birds to serologically react to antibody testing for IAV. A more recently developed vaccine is the recombinant vaccine, which provides immunological protection to the poultry but does not result in a serologically non-negative antibody test. If this product is used, it will be used according to manufacturer and USDA directions.

Inactivated Influenza A vaccine is an oil-emulsion product that requires subcutaneous injection of individual birds. Since it is a killed product, the vaccine can be safely administered at any age and will not spread from bird to bird or from parent to offspring. However, maternal antibodies can be passed to progeny resulting in seropositive test results in progeny for a period of time.

1. A pre-vaccination IAV test is required. Only flocks that are negative (based on thirty (30) randomly selected birds per house) by antibody detection on serum and PCR on tracheal swabs within the previous four days are eligible for vaccination.
2. The recommended age for initial vaccination is 6-10 weeks of age. Booster vaccination may be applied 4-6 weeks later. The withdrawal time prior to slaughter is 42 days (6 weeks).
3. The recommended dosage is 0.5 ml per bird. The vaccine should be warmed to room temperature before using. It is injected subcutaneously in the neck.
4. Homologous vaccination program
    a. One hundred (100) non-vaccinated birds (or 10% of flock, whichever is less) should be permanently identified with leg bands or wing bands and placed randomly throughout each poultry house to serve as non-vaccinated sentinel birds. All remaining birds will be vaccinated.
    b. The vaccination crews will follow strict biosecurity procedures.
    c. Vaccinated flocks will be monitored in the following manner:
        i. An entrance logbook must be maintained at each poultry house containing the date, time, name, company, purpose, and estimated duration of all visitors to the poultry house.
        ii. Any medication or vaccinations given to birds must be recorded.
        iii. All sentinel birds must be accounted for during the lifetime of the flock. Any morbidity or mortality in sentinel birds must be reported and samples submitted to the VDACS lab for follow-up diagnosis.
        iv. Thirty (30) serum samples from non-vaccinated sentinel birds will be tested for IAV using AGID every two weeks. Alternatively, sentinel birds may be tested using PCR.
5. Heterologous vaccination program
    a. All birds will be vaccinated with inactivated vaccine containing an N type different from the challenge virus.
    b. The vaccination crews will follow strict biosecurity procedures.
    c. Vaccinated flocks will be monitored in the following manner:
        i. An entrance logbook must be maintained at each poultry house containing the date, time, name, company, purpose, and estimated duration of all visitors to the poultry house.
        ii. Any medication or vaccinations given to birds must be recorded.

iii. Morbidity and mortality consistent with Influenza A must be reported and samples submitted to the VDACS lab for follow-up diagnosis.
iv. Thirty (30) serum samples from randomly selected birds will be tested for IAV using a differential subtype specific test every two weeks. Alternatively, birds may be testing using PCR.

6. Eggs may be moved from vaccinated flocks as long as the flock continues to test negative for IAV according to the above protocol.
7. All birds on vaccinated premises are under quarantine for the life of the flock and may only be moved to slaughter under permit issued by the State Veterinarian.
8. If any non-vaccinated sentinel birds or heterologously vaccinated birds test non-negative for IAV or have clinical signs consistent with IAV:
    a. Tracheal swabs and serum will be collected from 30 sentinel birds (if present) and 30 vaccinated birds per poultry house.
    b. Any vaccinated flock determined to be infected with Influenza A will be depopulated immediately.

APPENDIX 13
VDACS Quarantine Release Requirements

Virginia Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services
Division of Animal Industry Services
Office of the State Veterinarian
Policy for IAV Infected Farm Litter Management and Quarantine Release

Litter Management

- After depopulation, litter must meet the following guidelines in order to be safely moved off the farm:
  - A total of 28 days of composting, with at least two sets of three consecutive days of temperatures above 131F.
  - At least 14 days must be composted in the house, unless otherwise approved by the state veterinarian, with three consecutive days of temperatures above 131F. After 14 days, if temperatures reach 131F for a period of three consecutive days, the compost pile may be moved out of the house, onto the same premises, and composted for the remainder of the 28 days, with the 131F being met for another set of three consecutive days.
- Only *permitted litter* will be allowed to move. Litter meeting the criteria to be safely moved will be designated as permitted by IMT subject matter experts, according to Appendix 10.
- The current laws and regulations of the Commonwealth pertaining to poultry litter management should be followed.
- Prior to movement of litter off the farm of origin by truck, tarps must be tightly fastened over the edges of the truck bed so that litter cannot blow out. The exterior of the trucks must be swept clean and the undercarriage, wheels and wheel wells sprayed with disinfectant. This can be done with a hand sprayer.
- After delivering litter at the point of destination truck beds will be swept clean and disinfected. Disinfection can be done with a hand sprayer.

Cleaning and Disinfection of Houses

GENERAL GUIDANCE

- All previously Infected Premises must be both CLEANED and DISINFECTED. Cleaning and disinfection practices during an outbreak should focus on virus elimination in a cost-effective manner.
- While traditionally wet cleaning and disinfection has been performed in many incidents, dry cleaning and heating of houses may be a preferred approach during a widespread HPAI outbreak. Damages done with power washers cannot be paid for by USDA. Any method(s) selected should consider the characteristics of the premises/houses and other factors which may impact the effectiveness of the virus elimination activities.

DEFINITIONS

- Cleaning: The removal of gross contamination, organic material, and debris from the premises, via mechanical means like sweeping (dry cleaning) and/or the use of water and soap or detergent (wet cleaning).
- Disinfection: Methods used on surfaces to destroy or eliminate HPAI through physical (e.g., heat) or chemical (e.g., disinfectant) means. A combination of methods may be required.

- Virus Elimination: Cleaning and disinfection measures conducted with the primary purpose to inactivate all Influenza A virus on the premises as cost effectively as possible.

OPTIONS-for premises that can be cleaned and disinfected (most premises):

Step 1 CLEANING OPTIONS

- Dry Cleaning-Timing & method of dry cleaning must not aerosolize virus.

and/or

- Wet Cleaning

Step 2 DISINFECTION OPTIONS

- Wet Disinfection with EPA Approved Pesticide

and/or as needed

- Drying & Heating (100-120°F for 7 days). At least three days must be consecutive days drying and heating at specified temperature of the seven days total.

and/or as needed

- Fumigation or Alternative Science-Based Methods. If APHIS is paying for service, then APHIS must approve prior to application.

NOTE: A premises may require a combination of methods, but at least one choice must be selected from Step 1 and Step 2. The cleaning and disinfection options selected and implemented must be included as part of the approved cleaning and disinfection plan and approved by State Animal Health Officials and APHIS for reimbursement.

For premises that can't be cleaned and disinfected:
In the unusual circumstance in which premises cannot be cleaned and disinfected, fallowing for 120-days—or a period recommended by the Incident Command—is prescribed. The length of this period will vary depending on ambient temperature and season. Fallowing should be reserved for premises that would need to be completely repaired or destroyed in order to be effectively cleaned and disinfected.

Quarantine Release

Quarantines will officially be released after Infected Premises C&D and have negative environmental samples. Environmental samples must be collected by state or federal regulatory staff. Control area surveillance samples must be complete with negative results.

Repopulation and monitoring after repopulation

Birds will be allowed back on premise once quarantine is released. Flocks will be monitored for clinical signs and unusual mortality based on production type Any clinical signs and/or unusual mortality will be reported to the State Veterinarian or their representative.

APPENDIX 14
Responding to Non-H5/H7 IAV Cases

Numerous mostly harmless strains of mild Influenza A exist throughout the world in wild bird populations, swine, etc., and despite strict biosecurity from time to time a commercial flock will become exposed to non-H5 or H7 subtype INFLUENZA A virus. With Virginia's high level of surveillance for H5 and H7 INFLUENZA A, it is possible that routine testing will detect antibodies for a non-H5 or H7 virus.

VDACS will immediately notify the relevant poultry company veterinarian or live production director of any non-negative test results and obtain additional samples (serum and swabs) for follow-up testing. VDACS will also notify the USDA-APHIS AVIC and the VPF, except when initial testing shows an atypical reactor not clearly non-negative on at least one sample.

If VDACS notifies a poultry company of non-negative test results, the poultry company will visit the farm to determine the presence of any clinical symptoms and collect additional samples for further testing as needed.

When notified by VDACS of an initial non-negative test result, the VPF will notify the other poultry companies in accordance with Appendix 18. VPF, VDACS, and USDA will consult and coordinate conference calls/meetings as needed. (Note: If the case involves a WVA flock that is part of a VA poultry complex, the WVDA plan will apply and the VA task force will consult with WVADA prior to initiating communications activities in VA.)

Poultry companies will immediately notify VDACS of any non-negative test results not obtained from VDACS labs.

If a Non-H5H7 strain of IAV is diagnosed the VPF will coordinate discussion among poultry companies, VDACS, and USDA officials to determine what, if any, additional surveillance should occur within close proximity to the index flock and what heightened biosecurity measures, including their duration, should be taken with regard to farm visits within close proximity and when transporting the flock to the processing plant.

Quarantines
The relevant poultry company will quarantine suspect IAV non-negative farms per VPF Company Quarantine Requirements (Appendix 6). In addition, the relevant poultry company will quarantine farms with test results that are not clearly negative, exempting movement of eggs within the Commonwealth of Virginia pending their disinfection and proper biosecurity, pending test results of any samples sent to NVSL.

APPENDIX 15
Health and Safety Guidance for Influenza A Responders

The following document provides updated practical guidance related to human Influenza A (IAV) infection prevention and control, including guidance related to training of workers, basic infection control, use of personal protective equipment, decontamination measures, vaccine and antiviral use, surveillance for illness, and appropriate evaluation of persons who become ill.

Background:

- HPAI A(H5N1) has been circulating in North American wild birds since January 2022 and has spilled over to infect backyard and hobbyist flocks, commercial poultry, wild terrestrial, and marine mammals, as well as domesticated animals to include cats. In March 2024, a multi-state outbreak of HPAI A(H5N1) in U.S. dairy cattle occurred and is thought to have been initially transmitted by wild birds. The outbreak in dairy cattle continues to spread among cattle and in some states, infected cattle have been implicated in transmitting the virus to near-by poultry farms.
- In 2024, several sporadic HPAI A(H5N1) infections have occurred in the U.S. in people from multiple states after exposure to infected dairy cattle or birds, as well as a few unknown sources of exposure.
- The risk of infection to the public remains low but the risk is higher for those with exposure to infected birds and other animals.

A pressing concern is that humans infected with an IAV virus and a seasonal, human influenza virus could act as a “mixing vessel” that allows genetic material to be exchanged between the viruses. This exchange could result in a novel virus that is spread more easily from person-to-person. If a novel virus that is easily transmissible to humans were to occur, a severe worldwide epidemic of influenza (pandemic) could ensue.

Due to the high importance of protecting individuals from becoming infected with an IAV virus, and to guard against the subsequent risk of viral reassortment, the Virginia Poultry Disease Task Force has developed the following health and safety guidelines for IAV responders.

Targeted Human Populations:

Any responder that has close exposure (within six feet) of infected birds, products or specimens from infected birds or enters the hot zone of a premise and has direct contact with infected carcasses or the contaminated environment; or has unprotected exposure to IAV in a laboratory setting. This can include:

- Poultry companies’ responders / field technicians

- Depopulation and disposal contract employees
- Government responders (including laboratory personnel)
- Contract growers and their families

Health and Safety Procedures:

The Safety Officer or his/her designee will be identified on site to assure compliance with the following procedures:

I. Identify individuals who have already had contact with infected birds, the products or specimens from infected birds or contact with infected premises.
   a. Aim is to inform these individuals of their exposure and necessary precautions to take to protect their health, including monitoring for illness during their exposure and for 10 days after their last exposure.
   b. If appropriate PPE was not used or there was a breach in PPE, follow III. Post-exposure Prophylaxis and IV. Testing guidance in the Responder Health Safety section below.

II. Obtain Informed Consent from Incident Responders.
   a. All responders who may be exposed to IAV virus infected poultry or a premise contaminated with an IAV virus will sign a Responder Consent Form.

III. Ensure that Basic Health and Safety Training is provided to responders.
   a. All responders who may be exposed to IAV virus infected live poultry or a premise contaminated with the IAV virus, will receive safety training from their employer, with assistance from the Local or State Health Department as needed.
   b. This training should cover:
      i. Basic infection control practices (aimed at preventing the spread of infection in bird populations and protecting the health of responders)
      ii. Proper use of personal protective equipment
      iii. Designated hot, warm, and cold zones of the infected premises, and activities that occur in each of these areas
      iv. Basic health facts about Influenza A in people, signs to monitor for, and actions to be taken if a responder feels that they might be sick.

IV. Monitor responder compliance with health and safety recommendations.

V. Monitor responder health and act as the point of contact if workers become ill.

VI. Act as the point of contact for responders to report a breach or failure in PPE in the Hot Zone.
   a. If this occurs during mobilization, this should be reported to the State and Local Public Health Departments (S/LPHDs) at the site of the response for follow-up testing and antiviral PEP consideration.

Basic Infection Control

Appropriate hand hygiene is important to protect responder health and prevent the spread of infection.

- Hand hygiene should consist of washing with soap and water for 10-15 seconds or the use of other standard hand-disinfection procedures as specified by the site safety supervisor.
- Hand hygiene is essential after contact with infected or exposed poultry, contact with contaminated surfaces, or after removing gloves.
- Hand hygiene should be performed prior to all breaks (especially when smoking or snacking will occur), lunch/bathroom breaks, and prior to leaving the affected farm.

Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

PPE will be worn in the hot zone. The level of PPE will be decided upon by the Incident Commander.

Disposable PPE will be properly destroyed after use of in accordance with best practices. Nondisposable PPE, such as rubber boots and powered air purifying respirators, should be cleaned and disinfected appropriately after use.

Examples of PPE to be utilized include:

I. GLOVES:

a. Nitrile or latex disposable gloves shall be worn within the hot zone.
b. Two pairs of gloves should be worn.
c. Heavy-duty rubber work gloves may be worn over the nitrile gloves. These outer gloves must be able to be disinfected if they are going to be reused. These gloves will be removed in the warm zone.
d. All gloves must be changed when they are torn or otherwise damaged. Gloves should be removed promptly after use and before touching non-contaminated items and environmental surfaces.

II. CLOTHING:

a. Responders should wear disposable outer garments that are impermeable.
b. Inexpensive (street) clothing may be worn under this outer garment.

III. SHOES:

a. Disposable shoes, protective shoe covers, or rubber or polyurethane boots that can be cleaned and disinfected must be worn to prevent the virus from being transported out of the hot zone.

IV. EYE PROTECTION:

a. Eye protection shall be worn to protect the mucous membranes of the responder's eyes (e.g., non-vented goggles, respirator with full face helmet).
b. If goggles are to be worn during the response then goggles should be worn when the person is being fit tested with that particular respirator.

V. RESPIRATORS:

a. Disposable particulate respirators (N-95 or higher), powered air purifying respirators (PAPRs) or ½ face or full-face respirators with approved cartridges must be worn.
b. A responder must pass a fit test initially and then annually in order to wear a respirator.

c. A pulmonary function test may be required by some employers.
d. The appropriate respirators must be worn when using decontamination and sanitizing chemicals.

VI. HAIR COVERS:
a. Disposable head or hair covers should be worn in order to keep the worker's hair clean.

Designated Control Zones and Associated Decontamination Activities

Control Zones are established around IAV non-negative premises in an attempt to lend order to the situation, prevent unauthorized access to the hazard, contain the agent, and provide functional boundaries for responders.

I. Hot Zone:
a. This is an exclusion zone. The contaminant is present in this zone.
b. The highest level of PPE that is necessary will be worn in this zone.
c. Responders who leave the hot zone must do so through the warm zone where they will be decontaminated.

II. Warm Zone:
a. This is a contamination reduction zone. No contamination should be present in this area.
b. A moderate level of PPE is required in this area. PPE from the hot zone is removed in this zone.
c. Equipment and responders are decontaminated in this zone.

III. Cold Zone:
a. This is a support zone. No contamination is present.
b. No PPE is necessary in this area.
c. Field administrative offices and clean equipment will be housed in this area.
d. Emergency equipment will be stored, if physically possible, at the interface of this area and the warm zone.

Decontamination Procedures When Leaving the Hot Zone:

I. Contaminated responders should remove and discard their protective clothing (except for the inner pair of gloves) before removing their respirators and goggles.
II. After removing the goggles and the respirator, the inner layer of gloves can be removed and discarded.
a. If only one pair of gloves is worn, then the gloves should be removed after removing the coveralls, boots, and hairnet, but before removing the goggles and then the respirator.
III. Hand hygiene should be promptly performed after removal of PPE.
IV. Shoes do not have to be discarded if they are inside boots that are disinfected or covered by disposable shoe covers that remain intact.
V. The Incident Commander and Safety Officer will decide if and when clothing must be discarded on site or can be removed from the premises.
VI. Contaminated responders should properly remove and discard, or disinfect, their PPE and wash their hands prior to eating, drinking, smoking or using the bathroom.

Responder Health Safety

Human safety is of utmost importance during a response effort to Influenza A. Below are a compilation of best practice recommendations for human safety put forward by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the United States Department of Agriculture.

I. Influenza vaccination:

a. Responders that may have an exposure to IAV contaminated materials should receive the seasonal human flu vaccine annually from their respective companies / physicians / local health departments in order to limit the opportunity for the IAV virus to recombine with a human influenza virus.
b. If a responder refuses to receive the seasonal flu vaccine, he /she will not be allowed into the hot or warm zone and will be asked to sign a Declination of Human Influenza Vaccine form.

II. Monitoring Responder Health During a Response:

a. All persons exposed to infected birds should be monitored for illness during their exposure and for 10 days after their last exposure.
    - Signs of illness include fever, cough, sore throat, runny nose, eye redness or irritation, muscle and body aches, nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea.
b. When responding to and arriving at an infected site, all responders (private, contract and government) will need to check in and be monitored by the Safety Officer and/or State and Local Public Health Departments (S/LPHDs) working for the Incident Command.
c. All responders shall be aware of and compliant with the procedures outlined in the health monitoring plan in place during their mobilization.

III. Prophylactic Use of Antiviral Drugs:

a. Antiviral chemoprophylaxis is not routinely recommended for personnel who used proper PPE and experienced no breaches while handling sick or potentially infected birds or other animals or decontaminating infected environments (including animal disposal).
b. However, responders may receive prophylactic medications if recommended by current CDC guidelines.

    In consultation with state and local health departments, antiviral chemoprophylaxis of persons with exposure to HPAI A Virus: Can be considered for any person meeting epidemiologic exposure criteria, such as unprotected close exposure to infected birds or direct contact with contaminated environments, exposure to an infected person, or unprotected laboratory exposure, or due to breaches in or failures of recommended PPE.

Decisions to initiate post-exposure antiviral chemoprophylaxis should be based on clinical judgment, with consideration given to the type of exposure, duration of exposure, time since exposure, and known infection status of the birds or animals the person was exposed to. If exposure was time-limited and not ongoing, five days of medication (one dose twice daily) from the last known exposure is recommended. See CDC's Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A Virus in Animals: Interim Recommendations for Prevention, Monitoring, and Public Health Investigations in the reference section below.

Testing

a. Testing of asymptomatic persons for HPAI A virus infection is not routinely recommended. However, in consultation with state and local health departments, offering testing for influenza A(H5) to asymptomatic workers with high risk of exposure to HPAI A(H5N1) virus [e.g., exposed to animals infected with HPAI A(H5N1) virus who reported not wearing

recommended PPE or who experienced a breach in recommended PPE] may be recommended.

b. Any person who develops signs or symptoms of acute respiratory illness or conjunctivitis after exposure to HPAI A virus, including persons who previously tested negative for influenza A(H5) virus, persons who previously tested positive for influenza A(H5) virus while asymptomatic, and those receiving oseltamivir post-exposure prophylaxis, should be isolated, and tested for influenza A(H5) virus.

V. Demobilization and Monitoring Responder Health After a Response:

a. Upon completion of response activities, responders shall check-out through their chain of command (Group Supervisor, Branch Director, Section Chief, Incident Commander) and Resource Unit Leader.
b. All documents shall be turned into the Documentation Unit Leader at the Planning Section in the Incident Command Post.
c. There are standardized procedures that provide instructions for responders to demobilize while still being monitored.
d. All responders shall be aware of and compliant with the procedures outlined in the health monitoring plan throughout their demobilization period (10 days after the end of their mobilization).

V. Post-Response Exposure Survey:

a. The state or local health department may request that the responders complete voluntary post exposure surveys after the incident.

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APPENDIX 16
Poultry Health Emergency Contacts

VDACS will maintain list and update as needed.

Virginia Poultry Federation
Hobey Bauhan
Office: 540-433-2451
Cell: 540-478-8199

Cargill
Dr. Laura Tensa
Veterinarian
Office:
Cell: 503-853-0546

Kenny Myers

Tim Wilson

Brent Young
Breeder/Hatchery
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Cell: 540-578-2212

George's Foods
Dr. Kirk Dobson
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Cell: 479-927-7403

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434-294-0835

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Forest Alderman
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VPGC
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Morgan Miller
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Pete & Gerry's
Kevin Phelps
Office: 603-616-5988

John Kellon
Cell: 717-824-5305

Fairfield Specialty Eggs Inc
Andy Headings
Office: 815-379-2867
Cell: 608-739-2468

Braswell Family Farms
Casey Strickland
Cell: 252-958-7221

Virginia Poultry Breeders Association
John Miles Jr.
President
Phone: 804-380-4536

Virginia Cooperative Extension

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Virginia Extension Specialist
Work: 540-231-8339

VMCVM, Blacksburg
Dr. Laura Hungerford

APPENDIX 17
HPAI Zone Movement Permits and EMRS Customer Movement Gateway for HPAI only.

HPAI Control Area Permitting Process

July2016

INTRODUCTION & PURPOSE

Quarantine and movement control activities are fundamentally important to prevent the transmission of highly pathogenic Influenza A (HPAI) from Infected Premises to non-infected premises. All premises in the Control Area are subject to movement restrictions. Typically, quarantines are imposed on Infected, Contact, and Suspect Premises; movement controls—continuity of business movements—focus on At-Risk and Monitored Premises in the Control Area. In an HPAI outbreak, permits are used to make movements into, within, and out of the regulatory Control Area from all types of premises.

Permitting allows premises to make necessary movements without creating an unacceptable risk of disease spread. Permits are used for both critical and essential movements (e.g., for animal welfare or to complete response activities) and for continuity of business movements. Permitting guidance may change over time depending on situational awareness and operational capabilities.

This document provides an overview of the permitting process—it does *not* define requirements for an approved permit, which may vary by State, incident, origin/destination of movement, reason for permit, and item being moved. These requirements and permitting decisions are based on the best scientific and epidemiological information available. Detailed permitting requirements for critical/essential movements are based on unified State-Federal Incident Command recommendations; continuity of business permitting requirements are based on Secure Food Supply Plans (this is the Secure Poultry Supply Plan for HPAI) and/or recommendations from the unified State-Federal Incident Command, APHIS National Incident Coordination Group, and State official(s).

To be successful, permitting requires frequent communication and collaboration between origin States, destination States, the unified Incident Command, and APHIS during an HPAI outbreak.

TERMS

There are two primary types of permit: the specific permit and the continuity of business permit; the continuity of business permit is subsequently divided into

two secondary permit types—an operational permit and a Secure Food Supply permit. Table 1 provides further information on these two permit types and what types of permitted movements they are used for. All permits must have State of origin approval—for interstate movements, the destination State must also approve the permit. All movements associated with the approval of these permits are termed *permitted movements*.

Table 1. Summary of Permit Types

Type of Permit		Type of Premises	Details	Into/Within/Out of Control Area?	Intrastate or Interstate?	Example
Specific Permit		Infected, Contact, Suspect	Includes critical movements (e.g. animal welfare) and essential movements (e.g. response activities). Specific permit may/may not be required based on risk and unified Incident Command recommendation.	Can be into, within, or out of Control Area; into or within Control Area more common.	Usually Intrastate, Rarely Interstate	Movement of animals on a Suspect Premises to a slaughter establishment in the Control Area.
Continuity of Business Permit	Operational Permit	At Risk, Monitored	Includes normal, operational movements necessary to keep premises in the Control Area in business during an outbreak. Permit requirements/criteria based on unified Incident Command, APHIS National Incident Coordination Group, and State officials' recommendation.	Can be into, within, or out of Control Area.	Can be into, within, or out of Control Area.	Movement of a rendering truck picking up mortality from an At-Risk Premises to another premises outside of the Control Area.
	Secure Food Supply Permit	At Risk, Monitored	Includes animal and animal product movements into the supply chain for feeding, growing, processing, or to market. Helps to secure the U.S. food supply during an outbreak. Permit requirements/criteria based on Secure Food Supply Plans and/or the unified Incident Command, APHIS National Incident Coordination Group, and State officials' recommendation.	Can be into, within, or out of Control Area; into or out of Control Area more common.	Can be into, within, or out of Control Area; into or out of Control Area more common.	Movement of washed and sanitized shell eggs from a Monitored Premises to market outside of the Control Area.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

The Emergency Management Response System 2.0 (EMRS) is the system of record for all permits and permitted movements into, within, and out of a regulatory Control Area. During an HPAI outbreak, it is used to document all permits and permitted movements.

Specific permit requests are made in coordination with the unified Incident Command. However, for continuity of business permits (both types), there is a new EMRS Customer Permit Gateway that enables registered producers to request these permits electronically through an interactive, secure, web-application. Requests
submitted in this manner appear automatically in EMRS and streamline the permit process. For more information on the EMRS Customer Permit Gateway, continue to *EMRS Customer Permit Gateway.*

OVERVIEW OF THE PERMITTING PROCESS

Each permit contains seven key pieces of information: these data are recorded in EMRS in as close to realtime as possible during an HPAI outbreak.

♦ Permit class (e.g., into Control Zone, out of Control Zone, or within Control Zone).
♦ Permit reason (e.g., direct to farm, direct to landfill, direct to slaughter, etc.).
♦ Origin premises (premises must be entered in EMRS).
♦ Destination premises (premises must be entered in EMRS).
♦ Item permitted (e.g., manure/litter, feed, eggs, and groups of animals).
♦ Item class (e.g., chicken-broilers, egg-edible pasteurized liquid, poultry litter, etc.).
♦ Duration/span of permit (e.g., how long the movement(s) are expected to occur, given
duration of Control Area and other factors).

The current permitting process is illustrated in Figure 1 for all types of permits. First, a permit request is submitted. Second, all data is confirmed in EMRS as complete and a pending permit is created. Third, the information/documentation associated with the pending permit is reviewed, resulting in a reviewed permit. Fourth, the origin State notifies the destination State that there is a reviewed permit. Fifth, the destination State denies or approves the permit. Sixth, the destination State notifies the origin State of their decision; if approved, the approved permit is issued in the seventh step. Finally, in the eighth step, the movement is made. Depending on the item and specifications of the permit, repeated movements may be allowed (e.g. if a producer continues to meet any requirements outlined, daily or weekly movements may be allowed on a single permit for a set period of time).

Figure 1. Overview of the Eight Steps in the Permitting Process



EMRS Customer Permit Gateway JULY 2016

INTRODUCTION TO THE GATEWAY

The Emergency Management Response System 2.0 (EMRS) Customer Permit Gateway (a.k.a."the Gateway") is a new secure web application which streamlines permitting for registered producers during a highly pathogenic Influenza A (HPAI) outbreak. The Gateway helps to make permitting more efficient for producers, States, and APHIS officials by facilitating the permit request process and reducing data entry requirements. The Gateway also provides producers with a way to see the real-time status of their permit requests. Using the Gateway facilitates timely and accurate data entry into EMRS, which is the USDA APHIS official system of record in an HPAI outbreak.

EMRS VS THE EMRS CUSTOMER GATEWAY

EMRS is a dynamic database, based in Microsoft CRM, which is the official system of record for foreign animal disease (FAD) investigations, animal disease outbreaks, and other national animal health incidents. This includes permitting documentation in an HPAI incident. To access EMRS, you need to have EAuthentication Level 2 access. Only APHIS employees, APHIS contractors, and State personnel have access to EMRS data; once in the database, the user's assigned role determines what records can be viewed and/or modified.

The **EMRS Customer Permit Gateway** is a separate, secure, web-based portal designed specifically for producers; only EAuthentication Level 1 access is required. In the Gateway, registered users can request a permit for movements into, within, and out of a regulatory Control Area and enter the associated, permitted movements. Permit requests and associated information submitted are automatically and simultaneously reflected in the dynamic EMRS database for review by State officials, APHIS officials, and the unified State-Federal Incident Command.

PERMITTING PROCESS WITH THE EMRS CUSTOMER GATEWAY

The producer must be pre-registered in order to access the Gateway; there is no charge for registering or using the gateway, however EAuthentication Level 1 registration is required.
After logging into the Gateway, producers can do 6 things:

1. Request access to a known premises or account (for premises or accounts they own or manage).
2. Create an address book entry for one or more premises.
3. Initiate a permit request.
4. Check the status of any permit request.
5. Download approved permit(s) in a PDF format.
6. Enter movement(s) associated with an approved permit.

Requests that have not yet been accepted into the system can be modified by the producer at any time. However, once producers submit their requests and these entries are accepted into the Gateway by the origin State, they are locked and cannot be changed. All accepted permit requests are automatically updated in EMRS so manual data entry by designated EMRS personnel is not required. In the event that changes are needed for an existing permit request, the EMRS staff must be contacted to make such modifications.

Figure 1 provides an overview for permit requests made in the Gateway.



As seen in Figure 1, after the permit request is reviewed to ensure all data is complete, the permit request is accepted, and a pending permit is issued and sent to the origin State for review. If the origin State reviews and all is in order, a reviewed permit is then shared with the destination State for denial or approval.

The destination State then informs the origin State of their decision to approve or deny the permit. If an approved permit is issued, producers can download that permit in the Gateway. At all times, an origin State or destination State may revoke an already approved permit—this may occur in situations where the epidemiological situation is rapidly changing.

After the permit is approved, a producer can enter all associated movement(s) in the Gateway. These movements automatically and simultaneously appear in EMRS for State and Federal officials. At any time, a producer can see the status of their permit: request submitted, accepted permit request, pending permit, reviewed permit, or approved permit as seen in Figure 2. When all movements are completed for a given permit, the status moves to completed, and the permit will no longer be visible in the Gateway.

Figure 2. Screenshot of a Producer's Permit Screen in the Gateway

TRADITIONAL PERMIT REQUESTS

All existing methods to make a permit request can still be used by producers that are not registered in the Gateway (e.g., an email to State officials or the unified Incident Command). At this time, registration in the Gateway is prioritized for producers that may are likely to have a high volume of movements. Please note that all permit requests—regardless of the request method—end up in the same EMRS queue for review by the origin State (and EMRS personnel, as needed, to facilitate accurate data entry). Unless there is an exceptional situation, such as an animal welfare concern that may dictate a prioritized movement, permits in the queue are handled in the order in which they are received.

FOR MORE INFORMATION

As always, if you are concerned about making a movement in an outbreak, it is an excellent idea to ensure your premises is registered in EMRS with a Premises ID number. This helps to accelerate not only a rapid response in the outbreak, but the permitting process.

For more information on the requirements for permitting for continuity of business, please refer to the *Secure Poultry Supply Plan* for HPAI (eggs, turkeys, and broilers; this plan is currently under development). For more information on

other types of critical movements (such as those for feed), please see the *HPAI Response Plan: The Red Book.* In an incident, permitting requirements may come from these sources and/or the unified State-Federal Incident Command, State officials, and the APHIS National Incident Coordination Group.

Additional HPAI-specific guidance on permitting, please see *Overview: HPAI Control Area Permitting Process* and *Testing Requirements for Movement from the Control Area*; FAD PreP Manual 6-0, *Permitted Movement,* provides details on definitions and the permitting process for all FAD incidents. For further guidance on HPAI testing requirements for movement from the Control Area, and other policy guidance, please go to https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal-emergencies/fadprep

APPENDIX 18
VPF Company Notification Protocol

When the rapid response plan requires VPF to notify Virginia poultry companies of diagnostic testing results, it is important that both VPF and poultry companies manage the information efficiently, effectively, and discretely. VPF will attempt to notify a designated primary contact at each company. If that attempt is unsuccessful, VPF will attempt to notify designated backup contacts with each company. VPF will use its discretion to determine the most appropriate means of notification, such as phone call and e-mail. The designated poultry company contact, or backup will be responsible for sharing the information with others within his or her company on a need-to-know basis only. The information should NOT be disseminated beyond company personnel with a definite need to know. VDACS will supply a communications officer, who shall maintain and update the following call list after quarterly meetings, but at least annually.

Following are primary and backup contacts for each VA poultry company:

Cargill Turkey Production
Dr. Laura Tensa
Veterinarian
Office:
Cell: 503-853-0546
laura_tensa@cargill.com

Brent Young (Backup)
Breeder/Hatchery
Office: 540-433-0110
Cell: 540-578-2212
Brent_young@cargill.com

George's Foods
Todd Kiracofe
Live Production Manager
Office: (540) 437.9626
Cell: (540) 624.9300
todd.kiracofe@georgesinc.com

Gloria Long (Backup)
Breeders
Phone: 540-437-9627
Cell: 540-476-2648
Gloria.long@georgesinc. com

Hendrix Genetics
Harrison Hudgins
Cell: 434-294-0835
Harrison.hudgins@hendrix-genetics.com

Dale Wood
Office: 434-263-4136
Cell: 434-774-4622
dalepineyriver@gmail.com

Perdue Farms
Dr. Rick Sharpton (Backup)
Veterinarian
Office/Cell: 252-435-7282
Rick.sharpton@perdue.com

Forest Alderman (Backup)
Breeder Manager
Office: 1-800-647-3231
Forrest.Alderman@perdue.com

Pilgrim's Pride Corporation
Dr. Elizabeth Dale
Veterinarian
(Primary Contact)
Office: 706-621-3987
Cell: 706-583-4473
Elizabeth.dale@pilgrims.com

Kent Layman (Backup)
Grow out
Office: 540-901-6206
Cell: 540-478-2298
kent.layman@pilgrims.com

Tyson Foods
Dr. Kevin Kessler
Regional Veterinarian
Office/Cell: 903-238-4435
Kevin.kessler@tyson.com

VPGC
Dr. Bob Evans
Veterinarian
Mobile: 540-578-2199

Patrick Evick
Live Production Manager
Office: 540-896-0213
Cell: 540-578-0997
pevick@vapgc.com

Select Genetics
Dr. Ben Wileman
Office: 320-222-9816
Cell:
Ben.Wileman@select-genetics.com

New Market Poultry/Tiptop
Jack Wigley (Primary Contact)
Office: 540-740-4260
Cell: 770-337-9028
Jack.wigley@newmarketpoultry.com

Braswell Family Farms
Jonathan LaFoe
Office: 252-459-2143 Ext 240
Cell: 252-955-2817

Shenandoah Valley Organics
Corwin Heatwole
General Manager
Cell: 540-810-1858
cbheatwole@gmail.com

David Fulk
Broiler Service Tech
Cell:
david.fulk@farmerfocus.com

Kalmbach Feeds
Dr. Jessica Higgins
Office: 419-294-3838
Cell: 614-769-1554
Jessica.higgins@kalmbachfeeds.com

Pete & Gerry's
Kevin Phelps
Office: 603-616-5988
Kevin@Peteandgerrys.com

Fairfield Specialty Eggs Inc
Andy Headings
Office: 815-379-2867
Cell: 608-739-2468

Appendix 19
Suggested Timeline for IMT Response (all times subject to change)

7:00am or other set time: Initial UC Meeting, at Harrisonburg RAHL, ICP, or other established meeting location. Topics: initial briefing, establish objectives, operational period, meeting schedule, solidify organizational structure using ICS Form 201, make recommendation to request a Governor's declaration of Emergency, call in the rest of the IMT, establish time and location to report to ICP.

8:00am: IC call with USDA leadership: DA-USDA, and ED-USDA, and National IC - USDA. Discuss when USDA will release information.

10:00am: IC call with VDACS leadership, and other state personnel to provide morning situational update to them. Discuss when VDACS will release information, based on when USDA will release it.

11:00am: Incident Coordination Group/Area Command Call, Tuesday and Thursday: 11am-12pm EST (subject to change)

12:00pm: C&G Meeting, led by PSC. Establish objectives for next operational period (12 hours): resources, limitations, constraints. Preparing for the Tactics Meeting using ICS Form 215, identify and develop tasks and outline resource assignments, detailed task assignments, reporting locations, reporting times, special equipment, and supply needs.

2:00pm: Tactics Meeting, Operations meeting to finalize ICS Form 215, agree on work assignments, identify resources shortfalls, resolve conflicts and coordination. Discuss tactics for performing depopulation within 24 hours of disease report from lab, and disposal to follow. If possible, finalize tactics for depopulation to be performed this day, as soon as Form 1-23 is finalized/approved. USDA is usually available to approve 1-23 forms from 7:00am to 7:00pm.

Prepare for Planning Meeting:

Operations: preparing update and coordinating with other staff

Planning: prepares draft assignments, develop resource and support needs and submits to Logistics, publishes meeting agenda, duplicates documents

Logistics: orders resources, verifies support and orders support (communications, transportation, medical)

Finance: verifies financial and admin requirements

3:00pm: Incident Coordination Group/Area Command Call, Monday, Wednesday, Friday, Saturday, Sunday:3pm-4pm EST (subject to change)

4:00pm: Planning Meeting, present draft IAP for review and revision, discuss tactics selected for next operational period. Last chance to review/update IAP.
IAP preparation: IAP completed and distributed to UC for approval. IAP duplicated and distributed for review before 7pm Debrief with C&G.

5:00pm: Group, Branch, Operations Debrief, field operators report accomplishments, shortfalls, issues up their chain of command. OSC relays information to make any adjustments to IAP.

7:00pm: Quick Debrief with C&G – any issues, assess progress

Suggested schedule for future full operational periods 7:00am to 5:00pm
Day 3 and beyond:

6:45am: OPS Brief with IMT
9:00am: IC Call with Industry
10:00am: IC Call with VDACS Leadership
11:00am: IC Call with USDA (T,Th)
12:00pm: C&G Meeting
2:00pm: Tactics Meeting
3:00pm: IC Call with USDA (M,W,F,Sa,Su)
4:00pm: Planning Meeting
5:00pm: Group, Branch, Operations Debriefing
7:00pm: Quick Debrief with C&G